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This report summarises much of our research project, funded by the Nuffield Foundation, 
that has been concerned with secondary school choice in England – a task that parents of year 
6 primary school do every year to seek admission to publicly funded secondary schools for 
their 10 year old child.  
The essence of our analysis is to explore the determinants of parental preferences from 
observing the preference lists of parents – the list of schools that they would like their child 
to be considered for admission. The rank-order of schools that parents list is their way of 
expressing their preferences for schools. Parents might be likely to have idiosyncratic reasons 
for choosing schools but it is also likely that all parents will attach some weight to the quality 
of the school. On the other hand, it is likely that parents would prefer not to subject their 
child to long travel times.  The list for each child provides admission authorities with 
information about which child would like to go to which school and their characteristics 
relevant to admission criteria. Schools have some control over their admission criteria 
(although only grammar schools are allowed to prioritise children by ability) and the 
admission authorities then have the job of matching children to schools and based on only 
the information provided by parents relevant to admission. In principle, any child can list any 
school but one admission criterion is invariably a geographical one - it is common to use 
proximity as the criteria that breaks “ties” in the higher eligibility criteria. For example, 
schools might give priority to SEN children, and to “looked-after children” (LAC are in the care 
of local authorities. usually through foster parents), and then to the year 6 children who have 
older siblings in the particular school. Any remaining places are usually awarded according to 
the proximity order of applicants until the capacity of the school is full. Parents are limited in 
the number of schools they can list, depending on Local Authority – many are limited to only 
three, while the most is six. An important issue for our research is that the finite nature of the 
list discourages parents from taking big risks in the schools they list – by listing schools that 
one’s child is unlikely to be admitted to. In particular, parents when faced with limited choice 
will be strategic in how they list schools. That is, parents have an incentive to think about 
what other parents are choosing to ensure that they do not “waste” a choice on a school that 
will be full of children with greater eligibility. 
The project uses the National School Preferences (NSP) data that contains the lists of all 
parents. This is linked to detailed records on pupil and school characteristics from the National 
Pupil Database (NPD), that together allow us to investigate school choices and admission 
decisions, and heterogeneity in these, across types of parents. England is a good laboratory 
for research into school choice because the money follows the student, there is little 
admission by ability, and there is a national database that records the education history and 
attainments of all pupils. We have detailed data on preferences for two cohorts. We know 
from this data that only 65% of parents list more than one choice; only 27% make as many 
choices as they can; only 39% put their local school top; and only 55% include their local 
school as one of their choices. 
The main questions we address are: to what extent do different demographic groups, and so 
different localities, face real inequalities in choice after accounting for heterogeneity in 
preferences and strategies; and, in what ways do choices respond to and mitigate inequalities 
of access?  
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We answer these questions, first using detailed parental ranked preferences data to examine 
the descriptive evidence of variation in decision-making and choice strategies by 
demographic group; and second, by statistically modelling parental preferences and schools’ 
admissions decisions, to derive measures of the quality of schools available to parents. 
The balance of evidence on the causal effects of the quality of school attended on educational 
outcomes, suggests that getting into a “good” school matters. Indeed, we find that it matters 
over and above any effect on educational outcomes (see Gorman and Walker, 2020). Data 
from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) includes responses from 
parents about how satisfied they are with their child’s school. Among parents whose children 
missed out on their preferred school 27% were very satisfied. Among those that were 
admitted to their preferred school 43% were very satisfied. Satisfaction comes from many 
sources – not just the educational outcomes. Parents, possibly more than anything, value the 
fact that their child likes being at school, feels safe at school, and has good friends at school. 
There is also widespread interest in the suggestion that allowing parents a degree of choice 
over which school to send their children to, may raise the quality of all schools through a 
competitive mechanism. Schools will strive to be better, not least because the money will 
follow the students who come. While, there is not a lot of evidence that directly addresses 
this suggestion, nonetheless school choice has been a major theme associated with improving 
school outcomes …. “the tide that lifts all boats” (Hoxby, 2003). At a minimum this requires 
that parents care about school quality, and that schools care about attracting students.  
In principle, parents have always had a choice of school: until the late 1980’s in England, 
parents could exercise choice by choosing where to live, or choosing to opt out of the state 
sector and send their children to private schools. School choice policies, such as those 
introduced from 1988 in England, are really best viewed as being concerned with changing 
the costs of the choices that are available. When looked at in this light, we can think about 
school choice systems not in terms of whether or not they facilitate a particular choice, but 
as a progressive measure that reflects the costs associated with many possible choices. Seen 
in this way, it is possible to evaluate each individual aspect of a school choice system in terms 
of the extent to which it does, or does not, reduce the costs of choice, and for whom.  
However, measuring school quality is difficult because it is both multidimensional and 
subjective. Parents value the consumption benefits of a safe and happy environment that is 
engaging for their children - that provides not just child-care but the satisfaction that their 
children’s developmental needs are being provided for. They also value the investment 
benefits of the promise of better outcomes – in terms of not just a better job but, more 
generally, equipping their children to have a more fulfilling life. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a 
simple operational definition is hard to come by.  
We focus here on two main proximate determinants of parental preferences: the distance 
from home to school, and the quality of outcomes. School quality is typically measured by 
researchers using test score outcomes – although policymakers, teachers, and parents, also 
attach importance to such outcomes. Distance is usually measured as a crow-flies distance by 
school admission administrators seeking to break ties in oversubscribed schools. The 
importance that parents attach to proximity likely comes from the fact that it proxies for a 
variety of characteristics – such as being part of a familiar home neighbourhood near to wider 
family and extended friendship groups, as well as the low cost and high convenience attached 
to close proximity. Valuing proximity would be consistent with the family already having 
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chosen to live in the neighbourhood. The extent to which parents choose schools close to the 
residential neighbourhood they have already chosen to live in, is revealing of parents’ 
attitudes towards the social mix of their neighbourhoods1. Proximity brings with it 
convenience – that it allows the child to more easily take advantage of after-school activities, 
and saves the time, trouble and costs associated with a long school commute. Since proximity 
is also commonly used as an admission criteria, the ease with which it can be measured is 
important – and crow-flies distance is likely to be least controversial. 
Relying on test scores as a measure of school quality is more problematic. Quality is likely to 
be driven by the “match” between child and school, which will inevitability be idiosyncratic. 
But it is very likely that parents may not be good at imagining how their own child might 
develop in one school relative to another. What is a good match for one child may not be a 
good match for another. Looking at absolute quality such as average KS4 test achievements 
does not control for the quality of the inputs. Given that school funding is increasingly formula 
driven there is, in practice, little variation in financial inputs – apart from the additional 
funding for low income children, the Pupil Premium. The education economics literature 
shows large school fixed effects in the determination of school outcomes, suggesting that 
schools matter to outcomes – through greater effectiveness in their teaching, for example. 
The same might be said of individual teachers. However, there is little literature on teacher 
level fixed effects for England, and there is relatively little research on which to base a 
consensus view over what the characteristics of a good teacher are.  Children also learn from 
other children – there are peer effects within schools. Moreover, prior achievement, 
measured say by KS2 tests, is also an input into future achievement. 
The UK government has implemented value-added measures to measure the outcomes 
children achieve, adjusting for differences in starting-points. However, even these are 
imperfect predictors of one’s own child’s success: they are measured with a lag of several 
years, and school resources, staffing, and teaching practices may have changed in the interim; 
they are noisy measures with substantial year-on-year variation for a single school; and they 
provide a single average measure of performance, rather than a tailored prediction for a child 
at a given starting point. In addition to these problems, any measure of school performance, 
raw or adjusted, can only be as good as the pupil assessments that it is based on – 
assessments may be vulnerable to perverse incentives, teaching-to-the-test, and grade 
inflation.  
In addition, the allocation of children to schools depends not only on who wants to attend 
which school, but also on school capacities. The mechanism by which places are rationed 
matters too. The school choice mechanism embodies the criteria used to rank child 
applicants. Varieties of the “Deferred Acceptance” (DA) school choice mechanism are now 
commonplace because of the proposition that they incentivise parents to report their true 
preferences to the school choice administrators (unlike the “First Preference First” (FPF) 
mechanism which favoured first preferences). Missing out on one’s top choice under FPF 
implied that one was also likely to miss out on one’s second choice. Thus, the consequences 
 
1 This is to characterise the choice of residence and of school as sequential, whereas common sense suggests 
parents consider schools as part of their choice of where to live. This problem is discussed in section 5.2 below.  
4 
 
of missing out were likely to be larger than under FPF than under DA. 2 We provide more detail 
on DA and FPF mechanisms in Section 3. 
DA is thought to encourage parents to report their preferences without consideration of the 
likelihood of admission. This theoretical proposition is, however, contingent of parents being 
able to rank all possible schools. Limits on this would give parents an incentive to choose their 
listed schools is a “strategic” manner – by which we mean that parents would need to second 
guess what other parents where choosing to list. In practice, the allowable number of choices 
that one might list is usually quite prescribed (as few as 3 in many cases and never more than 
5, except in major metropolises where 6 is common) and a degree of strategic decision-
making might therefore be incentivised.  
Records of parents’ school preference lists in England, made available by the UK Department 
for Education, reveal that a majority of parents do not plump for their nearest secondary 
school, but the most popular state schools can draw applications numbering many multiples 
of their year seven entry quotas. When we look more closely at the data on families’ 
preferences, and the schools that children ultimately get allocated to, we find surprising levels 
of variation in both the preferences people express and their chances of admission to their 
preferred schools. We see quite varying choices and outcomes for different demographic 
groups - by income, ethnicity, and prior attainment. We also see variation by local school 
market and by region. Perhaps most strikingly, we uncover what appear to be substantial 
inequalities in access to chosen schools, for minority ethnic families, when compared to white 
families. 
However, given that admissions oversubscription criteria are tightly circumscribed by 
regulations intended to protect children from discrimination, is it likely that the observed 
patterns reflect real inequalities of access to good schools? Or, should alternative 
explanations draw on differences in preferences and choice strategies to explain the gap? This 
project uses the national school preferences data, linked to detailed records on pupil and 
school characteristics from the National Pupil Database (NPD), to investigate heterogeneity 
in choices and admissions. The questions we address are: to what extent do different 
demographic groups and different localities face real inequalities in choice, after accounting 
for heterogeneity in preferences and strategies; and in what ways do choices respond to and 
mitigate inequalities of access? 
There is a burgeoning literature on school choice in the English context, but in fact there are 
only a handful of papers that specifically look at variation in access to schools for different 
groups in different locations, and there are no other papers, as far as we know, that address 
strategic choices. Allen et al. (2014) analyse national administrative data to show that parents 
 
2 Prior to 2006 secondary schools in England were able to use the First Preference First (FPF) admission 
mechanism – some did, while others used the DA mechanism that is now obligatory. Gorman and Walker (2020) 
consider the role of the school admission mechanism by comparing areas of the country that used DA with areas 
that used FPF. Using distance-matching to weight their observations (in the LSYPE data) they find that missing 
out one’s preferred school had much larger detrimental effects on outcomes in an FPF area than it would in a 
DA area. Missing out under FPF reduced the chance of gaining 5 GCSE A*-C grades by a statistically significant 
and economically meaningful 11% compared to not missing out, while under DA it was a statistically insignificant 
2%. Staying on post-16 was greatly reduced, and there were long term impacts on earnings (at age 25) of 6% 
under FPF, again statistically significant and economically meaningful, while it was just 1% under DA. There were 
important adverse effects of missing out on one’s first choice under DA on mental health at age 25 but this was 
only half of the size of the mental health effect under FPF. 
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do not always choose the highest-performing school that is available to them. Weldon (2018) 
documents the ethnic gap in chances of admission to one’s first choice school. Recent work 
by the Education Policy Institute (Andrews and Perera 2017; Hunt 2018b, 2019a, 2019c) has 
analysed the administrative preferences data to shed light on varying access over time and 
by location. Wilson and Bridge (2019) review international evidence on school choice systems, 
finding that increased choice usually goes hand in hand with increasing social stratification 
between schools. Allen and Higham (2018) assert that new free schools are socially selective, 
but they do not account for the possibility that the sorting they observe is caused by choices, 
rather than constraints.  The previous work to examine the variation in access to school 
quality in England includes Allen et al. (2014), Hunt (2018b, 2019a, 2019c), and Burgess et al. 
(2019). This report provides evidence that between-school stratification along social and 
ethnic lines is driven primarily by a combination of heterogeneity in preferences and 
residential segregation, rather than by the way in which selection by schools has worked. 
At first glance the patterns, revealed by the recent availability of data on parental preferences 
and by school allocations data, point to a picture of admissions inequality, where schools 
appear to preferentially select white, non-poor pupils and exclude those eligible for Free 
School Meals, and minority ethnicities. However, cream-skimming to the extent suggested by 
the data is implausible, as a majority of schools do not even have sufficient admission 
autonomy to discover the income, ability, or ethnicity of pupils, let alone act on that 
information. Indeed, further inspection shows that the patterns instead point to the role of 
parental preferences and the strategic element of their decision-making.  
This is the first work to attempt the task of disentangling choices from admissions success. 
This report summarises how we achieve this by explicitly modelling the probability of 
admission to schools, and how we use this model to decompose the variation in the quality 
of allocated schools into components due to geography, admissions, and preferences. 
• What weight do parents place on the factors that they trade-off against each other 
when evaluating schools: school performance, proximity, and admission chance? 
• How much variation is there in the weights that parents use? In particular, do these 
weights, that determine preferences, vary across types of parent? 
• To what extent does the design of the system affect the quality of choices that parents 
experience? By design we mean: school locations and capacities, the relevance and 
availability of information, and the nature of oversubscription priority rules.  
• Are there simple interventions that can improve choices by parents? 
Before we spell out how we attempted to answer these questions, we preview our findings. 
In brief, these are: 
• On average, we estimate that parents place a considerable weight on school 
performance (our proxy for quality). By observing their choices we suggest that 
parents are prepared to allow their child to travel an additional 0.9 km (when the 
mean distance is around 2.5 km) to achieve a 10 percentage point better quality 
school. This is a considerable burden that households seem to be willing to pay. 
• Holding other variables equal, minority ethnic groups are more willing to travel for 
incremental improvements in school performance than white parents. White parents 
are willing to send their children 11% further for a 10 percentage point improvement 
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in a school performance measure (proportion achieving 5+ good GCSE’s), whereas 
minority ethnic parents are willing to travel 21% further for the same improvement. 
• Minority ethnic families are, on average, 17% less likely to achieve their first-choice 
school (and more so for Black, than Asian or Other), and this pattern persists when 
looking only at London. Overall, Londoners are less likely to get their first-choice. 
• After accounting for ethnicity, parents of children with attainment in the top tercile of 
KS2 (end of primary school) tests, are willing to travel 50% further for a 10 percentage 
point improvement in test scores, than the families of children in the bottom tercile. 
• We explore the simplest and cheapest possible intervention – extending the length of 
lists that parents are able to specify. Our data suggests that many Local Authorities 
restrict the ability to list sufficient schools – something that causes parents to be too 
conservative in their choices. While this enables LAs to say that it has a high proportion 
of children attending their first choice – but if their first choice is an unduly safe one 
then this is a hollow achievement. 
• But further reforms could improve the choices that parents make – through better 
information provided using tools that are familiar to us as consumers in the context 
of choosing hotels, flights, and movies.  
• In work in progress, we show that reforms to admission criteria offer the possibility of 
manipulating the allocation of children to improve the chances of disadvantaged 
children attending more effective schools and benefitting from high ability peers. 
Additional social mobility might be obtained at minimal cost.  
• In the longer term, we believe that the research here could be extended to include 
not only the role of peer effects but other policies could also be considered – those 
that change the nature of the choices available through improving schools, changing 
the nature of others, and closing/expanding/relocating existing schools. A major 
challenge to this long-term agenda would be to incorporate location decisions by 
parents. 
The rest of the report is structured as follows. An important innovation here is the use of 
data on parental preferences, so Section 2 is dedicated to explaining the data that we use. 
The salient basic details of the way in which school choice works in England in given n 
Section 3. A major aspect of our work is to be able to distinguish between the roles of 
preferences that drive demand and school capacities and the process by which schools 
ration their capacity when they are oversubscribed. Section 4 explains our approach to 
modelling preferences and describes how we model admission. The probability of 
admission plays into preferences because the school choice system incentivises strategic 
behaviour in parents and this is outlined in Section 5 and the basic statistical findings are 
presented. Section 6 then uses the statistical estimates to make inferences about how 
well different groups of the population are served by the school choice system. It also 
shows how it well works, and how it might work better, across areas of the county. Section 
7 speculates on how the school choice system could be improved. Finally, Section 8 
explains how the research is being extended to show how social mobility might be served 
by changing admission criteria and how the work could be extended further to analyse a 
wider variety of policy issues. 
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2.  Setting and data 
To gain insights into choices and admissions, the project capitalises on the newly available 
parental preferences data for England. The full dataset consists of records for all children who 
were in year 6 in the academic year 2013/14, and were applying to English state-maintained 
secondary schools for entry in September 2014. For each child we have a record listing up to 
six schools that were ranked by the child’s parents as part of the Local Authority’s co-
ordinated allocations process. We also have the child’s Key Stage 2 (KS2) results and year 6 
census record, and the linked year 7 census record for 2014/15, were also available. The 
school identifiers allow linking to school performance tables (containing school-level GCSE 
performance measures), the school-level census data (for demographic information), 
historical Ofsted data, and to Edubase, the public database of schools’ information. 
The preferences dataset identifies the schools listed by each parent, and also identifies the 
school that was offered to the parent at the conclusion of the admissions process. From this 
we can determine the family’s chosen school, whether or not the child gained admission to 
that school, and the rank of the school that the child did gain admission to. The linked datasets 
provide the child’s location, prior attainment, ethnicity, Pupil Premium status and other 
characteristics, as well as identifying the secondary school the child actually enrolled in, if the 
child stayed in the state sector. 
The cohort contains rank-order lists for around half a million children who are in their final 
year of primary school (aged 10-11), linked to their home postcode, ethnicity, gender, Pupil 
Premium status, and primary school test scores from the National Pupil Database (NPD). From 
the home postcode we can calculate their location and proximity to all schools 3. The NPD also 
provides detailed information on schools, including location, test scores, demographic 
composition, governance and religious denomination. We also obtain current and historical 
government inspections (Ofsted) scores from the online schools database, Edubase. 
Individuals are eligible for inclusion in the sample if there exists a rank-order list record for 
the child, and additionally they are either included in the year 6 census4 (final year of primary 
school), or the year 7 census (first year of secondary school), or both, and their home 
postcode, ethnicity and KS2 attainment are not missing. This means that those children 
transitioning from a private primary school, or who eventually transition to a private 
secondary school, are potentially included in the sample as long as their parents participate 
in the state-school admissions cycle. Our report employs a consistent demographic cross-
classification to allow for variation in parental income, academic attainment, and ethnicity. 
Much of the existing work on school choice focusses upon variation by socio-economic status 
or incomes, and finds significant variation, so it is important to allow for this dimension in our 
classification by including Pupil Premium status as a demographic indicator. The Pupil 
Premium (PP) is an initiative that awards additional funds to schools for each child on roll who 
is eligible. Pupils are eligible for PP if they have been eligible for Free School Meals at any time 
in the last six years, and pupils are eligible for Free School Meals if their parents have low 
incomes and are in receipt of certain benefits. PP is therefore a proxy for low incomes. 
 
3 School proximity is measured as the straight-line distance between the centroid of the home postcode and the 
centroid of the school postcode, in kilometres. 
4 Children in private schools are not included in the National Pupil Database census. 
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We also control for variation in attainment at primary school by including tercile of Key Stage 
2 (KS2) SAT scores in the classification. KS2 tests are taken by children at the end of the final 
year of primary school (at the age of 11) and give an aggregated score for ability in English 
and Mathematics. It is important to note that, as the admissions cycle takes place at the 
beginning of the final year of primary school, children will not have taken the test when their 
parents are choosing schools, and schools will not observe KS2 attainment. However, KS2 
terciles are used as a correlate of unobservable family and child characteristics that affect 
school choice and admissions. It is possible that KS2 terciles are endogenous with respect to 
admissions outcomes – for example, it may be the case that the parents who live close to a 
good school are also likely to urge their children to do well. However, this is not likely to 
substantively impact our results as KS2 tests are low stakes, that have no bearing on 
admission priority at schools, even though they may cause parents and children some stress. 
Since they have no bearing on admissions, there are no incentives for parents or children to 
alter effort in response to admission decisions. 
However, KS2 may be correlated with unobservable variation in parental characteristics and 
behaviour. In particular, KS2 outcomes may be affected by spillovers from parental 
investments in gaining entry to grammar schools, such as helping children with homework, 
maintaining discipline and procuring private tutoring. KS2 tercile therefore incorporates 
information about the parents’, as well as the children’s, unobservable type with respect to 
human capital investments.  
Ethnicity is measured in the NPD based on parental reports. There are 18 ethnic groups in the 
original data but for most of the analyses here a two-way white/minority classification has 
been used. While this two-way classification hides all distinctions between non-white ethnic 
groups, it ensures that the aggregated sample size of the minority group is large enough when 
cross-classified by income and attainment, and also ensures sufficiently large sample sizes 
outside London and the major cities. A four-way classification (white British; black; south 
Asian; other) has been used in some of the graphical descriptive statistics. Weldon (2018) 
presents descriptive analyses and also a discrete choice model estimated using the four-way 
classification, with the conclusion that the important distinction with regards to school choice 
and admissions is between white families and all other ethnic groups. Ethnicity is related to 
other constructs such as nationality, religion, language and the length of time spent living in 
the UK. It is possible that phenomena ascribed to ethnicity in the paper should more properly 
be ascribed to one of these other constructs. However, the other constructs are not recorded 
in the data used in this study. 
There are therefore 12 demographic groups defined by the cross-classification of ethnicity 
(white/minority), Pupil-Premium status (eligible/not eligible) and KS2 attainment terciles 
(high/middle/low). For each child we observe their demographic group, home location at the 
postcode level, rank-order list, the offered school and the school that the child was 
subsequently enrolled in. 
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3. The English admission system 
In England, children transition from primary school to secondary school at the end of the 
school year in which they reach 11. To apply for a place at a state secondary school in England, 
parents submit a ranking of their preferred schools. They can list between 3 and 6 schools 
depending on the Local Authority (LA). Parents must apply within their own LA, but may 
include any school within or outside their own LA on their list. Local authorities allocate places 
according to a matching mechanism co-ordinated by each LA and through collaborations 
between neighbouring LAs. 
A matching mechanism is a (usually computerised) procedure taking as inputs parents’ stated 
preferences (submitted as a rank-ordered list of schools) and schools’ capacities and over-
subscription policies (submitted by schools as a rank-ordered list of eligible pupils), and 
outputting a school allocation for each child. The rationale for matching mechanisms is to 
provide a fair allocation, acceptable to all parties, while avoiding the time and inconvenience 
for both parents and schools, that would arise if allocations were decentralised5. The two 
main types of matching mechanism that have been used in England are: 
First-Preferences-First (FPF) In the first round, children are allocated to their first choice. If 
there are not enough places, the school’s priority rules are used to decide which first-
preferers gain a place. If there are any places remaining, the procedure is repeated for those 
ranking the school second, third etc. This method was common up to 2006. 
Deferred Acceptance (DA)6 In the first round, pupils are provisionally allocated to their first 
choice, using the schools’ priority rules where schools are oversubscribed. In the second 
round, pupils left without a place in the previous round are provisionally allocated to their 
second choice. However, in DA (and not in FPF), a pupil who has higher priority at her second 
choice than someone who was provisionally allocated in the first round, can knock that person 
out of their place. Therefore, having a first preference for a school does not give a child 
priority at the school. In the third round, those without a place (including those knocked out 
of their provisional place in the previous round) are provisionally allocated to their next 
choice, and so on. This was mandatory from 2007 but was also used in many LA’s prior to this. 
Although efficient (as they maximise the number of people obtaining their first preferences) 
FPF mechanisms were criticised on the grounds that they forced parents to consider the 
chances of admission when stating their preferences, and were vulnerable to gaming by 
sophisticated parents (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003).  Since FPF mechanisms were 
banned in 2007 (Department for Education and Skills 2007), use of the DA algorithm (Gale 
and Shapley, 1962) has become ubiquitous (Coldron et al. 2008; Pathak and Sönmez, 2013). 
For oversubscribed schools, allocation of places is prioritised based on a set of criteria which 
depends on the school, typically including: whether the child is under the care of the local 
 
5 To give an example of the difficulties with decentralised matching, suppose a parent applies separately to two 
schools. He receives an offer in March from his second favourite school, and accepts. His favourite school has 
this child on a waiting list until July, and then finally offers this child a place. He rejects the offer from his second 
favourite school, which now has an empty seat, which it manages to fill in August. At this point, 3 weeks before 
the first day of term, some other school has an empty seat and has to make another offer, and so on. 
6 There are two variants of this mechanism (pupil-proposing and school-proposing). The pupil-proposing 
mechanism is described here. The two mechanisms are similar, but do not always produce equivalent outcomes, 
and it is not known whether all English LA’s use the pupil-proposing variant. 
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authority (``looked-after'' children, LAC); whether the child has an older sibling at the school; 
and, finally, the distance from the school. In some schools, religious worship or baptism forms 
an additional criterion that is inserted somewhere between the proximity tiebreaker and the 
LAC criterion. In a small proportion of state schools, a priority is attached to those displaying 
an aptitude at a particular subject or a range of subjects. Finally, there are a small number of 
grammar schools which fill all of their places based on performance in tests or an exam, 
known as the 11+ exam.  
If a pupil cannot be allocated to any of their listed preferred schools, they are assigned to a 
school with spare capacity and this is not necessarily the nearest. In spite of this, many parents 
list fewer than the maximum allowed number of schools. 
For the purposes of this study, schools have been categorised into six broad groups, according 
to their admissions policy and ethos: 
Community schools The first group comprises those schools owned and controlled by LAs, 
comprising 20% of secondary school places in 2014. These schools generally have simple 
admissions criteria, prioritising siblings, ‘looked after’ children and those living within a 
designated zone, with straight-line distance used as a tie-breaker. Until recently the largest 
group, since 2010 many formerly community schools have been converted into state-funded 
autonomous schools called ‘academies’. 
Non-faith academies7 This second group is now the largest group, enrolling 57% of state-
funded secondary school children. These schools have some autonomy to set their own 
admissions criteria although within the strict guidelines set by the government. Many 
academies have similar admissions criteria to community schools. Some academies include 
aptitude in a particular subject or range of subjects in their admissions criteria. Some schools 
operate ‘fair banding’ criteria, where a quota of children is admitted from each attainment 
(KS2) quantile. This category includes Free schools, which are a type of academy set up by 
parents or other interest groups. 
Roman Catholic schools 11% of secondary school children are enrolled in Roman Catholic 
schools, making this the largest faith school denomination in secondary schooling. RC schools 
usually select up to 100% of their intake on religious grounds. At many schools proof of 
baptism is sufficient, although at the more popular schools proof of regular church 
attendance may be required. Some schools reserve a proportion of places for children of 
other faiths/no faith.8 
Church of England schools The second largest providers of denominational secondary 
schooling are Church of England (C of E) schools (7% of places). A majority of C of E schools 
also require proof of religious worship for some or all places. The admissions criteria of C of E 
 
7 Many faith schools and grammar schools are also designated as academies, but for the purposes of this study 
this category only includes those academies which are not faith schools or grammar schools. 
8 Faith schools are commonly thought of as high-quality schools. They are often oversubscribed. Yet there is 
almost no quantitative literature, for England, that addresses the effectiveness of faith schools. McKendrick and 
Walker (2020) uses LSYPE data to estimate the effect of attending a faith school. The raw data shows that faith 
schools do have better educational outcomes. However, they find that the alleged advantages of faith schools 
are not robust in the data to more detailed analysis. The only robust finding is that children that profess faith 
and attend a faith school do tend to be more likely to retain their faith into adulthood. 
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schools are more heterogeneous, and support for religious selection less unanimous in the 
Anglican sector than in the Roman Catholic sector.  
Other faith schools There are a very small number (less than 1%) of schools with religious 
denomination other than Anglican or RC. These include schools catering to Jewish, Muslim, 
Buddhist and minority Christian sects. These schools often operate faith-based admissions 
criteria for some or all places. 
Grammar schools There are just 162 academically-selective grammar schools (enrolling less 
than 5% of children) -- the remainder of a much larger system of academic selection that 
existed prior to the 1970's. To obtain a place at a grammar school, children are required to sit 
an academic exam. In some Local Authorities all 11-year old children sit a common exam, 
whereas in others only children who wish to apply to a school sit the school's exam. 
Figure 1 summarises the excess capacity for the major school types listed above. There is 
excess capacity overall – driven by Academy and Community schools. However, this 
aggregate picture masks the uneven geographical supply of capacity, with large surpluses in 
some areas, and a dearth of places in others. Catholic and CofE schools have small overall 
over-capacity, while Grammar Schools face excess demand and every place is filled so that 
admissions equal capacity. 
Figure 1:  Capacity, demand and admissions in 2014 at each school type, as a 
proportion of total capacity in year 7 in England. 
 
Strict guidelines regulate the admission criteria that schools are permitted to use. Some 
unlawful criteria include: interviews or other face-to-face contact; rank-order (eg. first-
preferences-first); and parental financial contributions or volunteering. In addition, new 
schools have more stringent restrictions on religious and academic selection than existing 
schools. All own-admissions schools may opt to receive a list of applications (without 
information on the preference order) and rank them before sending the ranking back to the 
LA for the matching to be computed. Commonly, local authorities provide services to assist 
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the ranking of students (for example, the calculation of home-school distances) as traded 
services to own-admission schools. For community schools the LA computes the ranking. 
In contrast to some other countries that operate centralised school admissions, lotteries are 
almost unheard of as a priority tie-breaking mechanism9 in England. The final tie-breaker for 
the majority of community, academy and religious schools is almost invariably the straight-
line distance between the school and the pupil home address. The distance tiebreaker creates 
the conditions for house prices to be affected by the proximity of good schools (Gibbons and 
Machin 2006, 2008; Gibbons, Machin, and Silva 2013; Machin and Salvanes 2016). 
Secondary school admissions are coordinated at the Local Authority (LA) level in England. In 
practice, this means that LA’s must provide a centralised clearing house, with a common 
admission cycle to which all schools must subscribe. There is no option for state-funded 
schools to admit pupils into the entry year outside the co-ordinated admission mechanism. 
However, in-year admissions for years other than the entry year are decentralised, and 
handled by each school separately. Since the introduction of school choice in 1988, successive 
Admission Codes have stipulated progressively tighter controls on the operation of admission 
systems. In 2007, the Admission Code outlawed mechanisms that allow schools to prioritise 
pupils based on their order of ranking (called ‘first-preferences-first’ mechanisms). Although 
efficient in the sense that they maximise the number of families who access their first-choice 
schools, such mechanisms are thought to provide parents with incentives to game the system 
by misreporting their preferences, which could risk benefitting more sophisticated, well-
informed, parents at the expense of others, and skew statistics on the admission system by 
inflating the apparent number of families accessing their first-choice school. The admission 
legislation has meant that, in terms of the clearing house mechanism itself, and permitted 
admission oversubscription rules, LA’s are similar to each other. However, in one aspect of 
the admission mechanisms there is still substantial variation - the maximum permitted size of 
submitted preference lists.  
Figure 2 shows that LA’s allow parents to rank between three and six schools. The figure 
covers all English LAs and the first two rows are London LA’s. London LA’s all allow up to six 
schools to be ranked and listed in submissions. Elsewhere, there is variation in the number of 
choices offered even across LA’s with a similar level of urban density. Moreover, parents do 
not always use all of their available choices, and there is wide variation in the distribution of 
choices used as shown in Figure 2. Many of the LAs that allow six choices have very few 
parents that use more than three; but many find that all 6 choices are often used. Among LA’s 
with a maximum of three slots, for example in County Durham or Cornwall, a majority of 
parents use only one preference slot, whereas in Lancashire the majority of parents do use 
all of their three available preference slots. Some allow three and many such LAs find that 
many parents submit only one or two schools suggesting that three is enough (for example, 
Gloucestershire). But other LAs allow three and many parents use all three (for example, 
Lancashire) – suggesting that if parents were allowed to list more than three then they would 
use the extra choices made available.  
 
9 One exception is Brighton and Hove LA, which has, since 2007, operated a system based upon catchment areas 
within which lottery tie-breakers operate. 
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4. Analytical framework 
Parents are asked to rank schools in order of their preferences – which depend on quality and 
proximity, but we also allow for preference for a school to depend on the probability of 
acceptance – that is we allow for risk aversion. 
Child application details are confronted with the admission criteria of schools that they apply 
for. This establishes their eligibilities and then children are allocated to the highest ranked 
school that they are eligible to attend. We do not know the details of the actual admission 
criteria used by each school. But we know that schools will have an ordered set of priorities 
such as SEN, LAC, and siblings;  and that some schools may also have geographical priority 
areas: some will prioritise faith in some way; and some may offer a priority for “aptitude” (but 
not “ability”) say for music, sports, or even maths. Remaining places are typically allocated by 
crow-flies proximity from home to school. We do not know the details, but our analysis starts 
by inspecting the data so as to infer the point at which priority applicants have been 
exhausted and remaining places are allocated for proximity. We do know the capacity of all 
schools. So, when a school is full remaining applicants are then considered for their second 
placed school. Simply by knowing the point at which allocations of school places begin to be 
awarded by proximity and the point at which this ends (i.e. the school is then full) we are able 
to consider the effects of a number of possible reforms. For example, we could add a further 
priority criterion below whatever the existing priorities are.  One obvious example would be 
to prioritise FSM children above those that live nearby. We could also replace the proximity 
criterion by a lottery. We could choose to leave Grammar Schools outside of any reform 
package, or we could include them by replacing admission by ability (which we assume can 
be proxied by KS2 since we do not know the actual grammar entrance test scores).  
Having allocated all children to all schools we know which school each child attends and 
therefore we know the peer mix at each school. To predict the KS4 outcomes we use an 
estimated education production function that includes own KS2, peer KS2 effects and an 
addictive school fixed-effect.  
4.1     Parental preferences for schools 
Our modelling of preferences is based on the presumption that parents like good quality 
schools (denoted Q) but dislike their child travelling a long distance to attend (denoted D). 
We assume that parents are “agents” for their children in such a way that child preferences 
are reflected in those of their parents – so we do not distinguish between the preferences of 
parents and children. We also allow preference variation across observable characteristics of 
the children, Z (which includes ethnicity, FSM status, and our measure of prior ability - the 
child’s KS2 score at age 10 prior to secondary schooling).  
We also allow for preferences to vary across the unobservable characteristics of parents, 
denoted by ξi. Note that we do not know ξi – we think of this as something that is unobservable 
but explains the variation that we cannot explain using the variables that we do observe. 
Astrophysicists, faced with the problem of understanding the universe, name ξi “dark matter” 
– a name that acknowledges the mysterious nature of the universe and yet suggests the hope 
that it may ultimately be observed. In contrast, economists often refer to ξi  as the “error 
term” – a name that suggests that we have made a mistake and holds out little hope that this 
will be ultimately reversed. Economists have been famously, and perhaps correctly, described 
as “dismal”, while astrophysicists are famously expensive in their pursuit of knowledge. 
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Hereafter, we will refer to ξi, more agnostically, as “unobserved heterogeneity” and we refer 
to the associated variation in behaviour as “idiosyncratic”. 
Our shorthand for the well-being of parents which, following standard economics 
nomenclature, we refer to as “utility”, is given by   
 Uis = U(Qs, Dis; Zis ,ξi)         (1) 
where Uis is the utility of the parent of child i when the child attends school s. This is assumed 
to depend (positively) on Qs (the “quality” of school s), which we think as a school level 
outcome. This can be measured by KS4 performance at the school such as the proportion of 
children at s attaining 5+ GCSE “passes”, or some other summary metric.10 It could be a school 
contextual value added measure. In addition, Uis depends (negatively) on the distance that 
child i would need to travel to attend school s. We measure this as the crow-fly distance from 
the centroid of i’s postcode to the centroid of the school’s postcode, in km. We think of this 
as a sufficient statistic for the time and trouble incurred in having i attend s. In principle, but 
this could be refined using actual travel time (and cost) and actual distances (from Google’s 
API or other source). Parental (and child) background variables are also included in Uis and 
this is summarised by the vector (i.e. list) of variables denoted by Zis. But conditional on Zis 
there is, on average, a systematic relationship between Uis and its other observable 
determinants - Qs and Dis. 
Thus, our model regards well-being, or utility, as a component that varies systematically with 
its observable determinants, but there is an unobservable component, denoted ξi, that is 
assumed to be randomly distributed, according to a bell-shaped distribution, across parents. 
This is sometimes referred to as a “Random Utility Model”. So, although all parents feel 
differently about the school options available to them we can incorporate these differences 
by assuming that they follow a specific statistical distribution. Here we assume ξi to be 
randomly Normally distributed, and independently of the other variables in the model.   
We aim to construct measures of school choice and of choice set “amenities” (the 
characteristics that affect parental preferences: e.g. distance and quality, among other things 
that might be attractive, or not, in the school neighbourhood) that are more informative than 
the more usual  “% achieving first choice” summary statistic. We also wish to decompose the 
variation in school matches that arise because of differences in parental preferences and how 
much arises because of differences in school capacity constraints. To do this, we need to 
define the structural models of both parents’ preferences and of constraints that are used in 
these measures.  
Utility is a function of observable “amenities” provided by a school (such as test scores, and 
proximity to the family home), and there are likely to be other amenities that matter to the 
parents, but are unobservable to researchers. We make no assumptions about the 
relationship between utility and parents’ expectations of the short- or long-run outcomes 
 
10 The data represents a cohort of parents who did not have a history of performance measures available to 
them. The contextualised value-added measure used before 2010 had been abandoned, and the Attainment 8 
and Progress 8 measures had not yet been introduced. The performance measure in most widespread use in 
2013 was the proportion of children at each school achieving the threshold of five GCSEs at grades A* to C. So, 
we adopt this measure as our measure of quality because of its ubiquity and salience to parents. However, it is 
a raw attainment measure, rather than a measure of quality per se, and as such it is highly correlated with the 
demographic characteristics and prior attainment of the school’s intake.Nonetheless, none of the qualitative 
results hang on the precise definition. 
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from education; we simply assume that each parent implicitly assigns utility scores to 
alternatives, and chooses the set of L schools that would generate  the highest expected utility 
score, out of all other possible combinations of L schools.  
We need estimates of the parameters of these systematic determinants, Qs and Dis, to be able 
to construct the level of well-being, or utility, associated with any match of i to s, so  we need 
to adopt a specific shape, or functional form, for equation (1). This function incorporates the 
assumptions required to aggregate the determinants of Uis that reflects the way individuals 
weight together D and Q. The specific equation that we adopt for utility is a simple additive 
one – utility depends linearly on Q and linearly on log D. We choose a logarithmic 
transformation of D, rather than D itself, to reflect our presumption that an extra kilometre 
makes a smaller difference to the intensity of preference for proximity the further away one 
is. This log transformation of D effectively assumes that U is linear in proportional (i.e 
percentage) increases in D. That is, we make (1) more specific in (2) by assuming that it is a 
specific “structure” that is linear in Q and log-linear in D, and that there are number of other 
observable variables, in the vector Z, that also affect well-being, so that 
 Uis = U(Qs, Dis; Zis ,ξi) = Qs + ρ.logDis + Zisχ′ + ξi    (2) 
Thus, Qs is some measure of quality of school s (which might be a value added measure, or 
simply the proportion of children in s that obtains, say, 5, KS4 passes, or something more 
complicated), Dis is distance from i’s home (postcode) to school s (postcode), and Z is a list of 
school and individual level characteristics. The variable ξi represents the unobservable 
determinant of U.  ρ is the unknown parameter that drives the trade-off between proximity 
and quality that parents are willing to make – we anticipate that ρ<0 because we expect 
individuals to be prepared to go further to get better Q but D itself has a negative effect on U 
for given Q. Note that we assume that the coefficient on Qis is 1 - this is innocuous because 
we are only concerned about the relative effects of Q and log D. Our aim is to estimate the 
value of ρ based on what we observe in the data on parental preferences. 
The interpretation of ρ is the percentage increase in D that a family would allow their child to 
travel to school to get a positive unit higher level of Q. We therefore think of ρ as the 
“willingness to travel” to obtain higher Q . In practice we allow the ρ parameter to differ 
across ethnicity etc. by estimating our equation (2) for U(.) separately for each of our 12 
groups of children (categorised by own ethnicity, FSM status, and range of KS2 score). This is 
a straightforward way of allowing the parameters of the preference model to vary across 
groups of parents who differ in their observable characteristics, Z. 
Figure 3 is a graphical description of what Uis looks like. Figure 3 is drawn in Q vs log D space. 
That is the vertical axis is Q and the horizontal is log D. One can rearrange equation (2) to have 
Q on the left hand side so that it reads Qs = ρ.log Dis + Zisχ′ + ξi - Uis , and when written in this 
way it shows that Q rises (linearly) by ρ per unit change in log D (i.e. doubling D) for a given 
level of U. Or, put another way, a parent would be equally happy that the child be at a school 
that is ρ% further away if its Q were one unit higher.  
The solid blue lines show combinations of Qs and log Dis , for an assumed level of ρ, that 
provides the same level of well-being to i. So any two schools on a given line of slope ρ, say s1 
and s2, are such that Ui1 = Ui2 – that is, the parent is indifferent between s1 and s2 since they 
lie on the same blue line. That is, s1 and s2 have the same value of U because 1’s lower Q , 
relative to 2, is just low enough to offset its closer proximity. And any school on a higher line, 
such as s3, , such as s1 or s2 , will have higher utility. Thus, s3 is preferred to s2 because it has 
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higher Q and is no further from home, while s3 is preferred to s1 because, although its further 
from home, it is much higher quality. Thus, a parent faced with these choices of school would 
rank s3 higher than s1 and would place schools s1 and s2 as equal second. 
But preferences can differ across parents. For example, the dashed blue lines shows the 
preferences of another parent who has a much higher value of ρ, say ρ’> ρ, then she would 
demand a much larger increase in Q to be attracted to a more distant school than was the 
case with  the parent who had a slope of ρ. We allow for such heterogeneity in the analysis. 
Figure 3 Graphical description of preferences 
 
 
4.2   A model with strategic choices 
If all schools had surplus capacity, this model would be sufficient since strategic behaviour is 
unnecessary if capacity constraints were non-binding: each parent would simply choose the 
alternative that maximises Uis. If parents were allowed to rank all possible schools then they 
would be rational to do so. If the list length is limited then parents would then realise that the 
probability of admission would depend on the rankings of other parents. This then generates 
incentives for parents to rank schools “strategically” – i.e. take into account the behaviour of 
other parents. It is unclear how they would do this, but a sensible strategy would be to 
choose, not the L best schools from the universe of schools, but to choose L schools that 
would generate the highest expected utility or well-being.  
The logic of the DA admission mechanism is that parental rankings will express the parents’ 
true preferences – that is, parents rank only on the basis of the well-being that they would 
enjoy if their child were attending each school. If you can list as many schools as you like then 
you can be sure to get into the best school in your list that you meet the criteria to be 
admitted.  In particular, parents will not need to (or wish to) take account of the probability 
of being able to attend each school. Since parents get the match to the school that they rank 
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highest provided they can be admitted, they have no cause to even consider the chances of 
getting in.  
The “mechanism design” theory underlying school choice that lies behind this presumption is 
based on the assumption that parents are able to rank ALL schools. In practice, Local 
Authorities limit parents to creating a listing of only a small number of choices of schools, say 
L of them. If L is small (and, in our data, it is often as small as 3, and never more than 6) then 
parents are then incentivised to factor into their calculation the chances that they will be 
accepted at the schools they would like to attend. That is, a parent may think she needs to 
play safe – to consider, in a “strategic” way, the rankings of other parents, which affects the 
chances of getting into schools that she likes, when choosing her own ranking.   
Here we pragmatically allow for this by incorporating an additive direct effect of the 
probability of i’s admission to s, denoted Pis, into our expression for Uis, so that (2) becomes 
 Uis = U(Qs, Dis; Zis ,ξi) = Qs+ β.logPis + ρ.logDis + Zisχ′ + ξi,  (3)  
where β<0 represents the parent’s attitude to the risk associated with choosing s, Pis. We use 
the log of Pis because when Pis =1 the model becomes the same as (2), and if it were 0 (i.e. no 
chance of acceptance) then that school would be given infinitely small weight in the parent’s 
preferences and it would be as if it did not exist for this parent. Note that Pis depends on how 
many children live nearer or have higher priority than i at s for some other reason, such as 
having a sibling at s. On the other hand, if i were to have a sibling at school s0, say, then Pi0=1 
because this sibling provides a guaranteed entry ticket to school s0. But, even so, the parent 
might still want to consider different schools to the child’s sibling, s≠s0 since a much better 
school might outweigh the convenience if sending the younger sibling to the same school as 
the older one. 
We estimate the parameters of this model using, so called, discrete choice estimation, and 
we allow each parameter to vary across each of our 12 groups defined by ethnicity (white 
British vs the rest; ), income (on FSM vs not), and ability (bottom , middle, and top thirds of 
the KS2 distribution). 
4.3    Probability of admission 
Pis in (3) is not something we can observe – it has to be calculated.11 In order to quantify the 
expected quality of choice sets, and to account for school capacities and admission 
probabilities, we need to estimate the chances that a child will be successful in obtaining a 
place at a school, if she applies. Pis will be 1 is i for all possible s if she in LAC or SEN. It will 
equal 1 for a particular s if she has an older sibling in that s. Otherwise, i will have some 
probability, less than 1, of gaining admission to each s depending on the capacity of s and i’s 
proximity to s. The bigger is s and the closer that i lives to s the better the chances of gaining 
admission; but the more SEN and LAC children and others with older siblings in the school 
that would also like to attend the smaller will be the chances. 
There are a handful of other papers that explicitly estimate joint models of strategic choice 
and the probability of admission (Ajayi 2013; Calsamiglia, Fu, and Guell 2014; Fack, Grenet, 
 
11 Note that Pis depends on Dis because Dis determines the number of children who live closer and so have higher 
priority than pupil i at school  s. In fact, Pis will be (approximately) inversely proportional to the square of Dis 
because the number of children living closer is likely to be proportional to the area of the circle with radius Dis, 
which depends on Dis2. 
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and He 2015; Ajayi and Sidibé 2016; Agarwal and Somaini 2018; Luflade 2018). Of these 
papers, Fack et al. (2015) avoid modelling strategic choice, but instead posit methods for 
recovering the distribution of preferences that are robust to strategy. Calsamiglia et al. (2014) 
and Agarwal & Somaini (2018) model decision-makers divided into strategic and sincere 
types, and estimate the proportion of each type in the population. Both papers find that the 
population contains both strategic and sincere decision-makers, but do not characterise this 
variation in terms of demographic variables. This report takes an approach similar to Ajayi 
(2013) and Luflade (2018) in modelling admission probabilities directly from what we observe 
about I’s characteristics. 
We take this probability approach throughout the report. Even if the priority mechanism were 
completely transparent and all data were available, admission would not be deterministic 
because; although, in that case, the schools orderings of students would be known, the 
proximity threshold (cut-off) at which schools cease to admit pupils would still not be known. 
This priority cut-off cannot be known in advance of the allocation, either by parents or to 
researchers, because it depends on the interaction of the demand for the school (i.e. the 
aggregate preferences of parents) and the school’s capacity, and the capacities of other local 
schools due to ‘overflow’.  Additionally, parents often do not have complete information 
about their priority For example, if the priority is based on religious adherence and must be 
evaluated by school staff. There may also be uncertainty about a child’s position in the priority 
ranking, since this depends on overall demand for the school for those with greater priority – 
for example, the number of children in the same cohort that have older siblings at the school. 
Uncertainty about the cut-off therefore induces uncertainty about the chances of admission. 
There are therefore multiple sources of uncertainty for parents that mean that it is more 
appropriate to model admission as a subjective probability.  
4.4    Measurement of choice set quality 
Our main aim is to use our “structural” model of school demand and supply to evaluate the 
quality of school amenities (i.e. quality and proximity) available to parents of different 
demographic groups, in different locations. Previous work to examine the variation in access 
to school quality in England includes Allen et al. (2014), Hunt (2018b, 2019a, 2019c), and 
Burgess et al. (2019). 
Our approach contributes to this literature by explicitly considering the level of school quality 
that families of different demographic groups, in different localities, can expect to be able to 
access, taking into account not only geographical proximity, but also admission criteria, school 
capacity, and differences in individual  preferences. 
In order to decompose the relative contributions of market, admission constraints, and choice 
behaviour, we quantify the quality of choices available to each child in terms of three possible 
definitions: 
A. The well-being associated with the local market, defined as the utility of the best 
school in each family’s choice set, where ‘best’ is defined using estimated preferences, 
and ignoring any capacity constraints or admissions rules. This may not coincide with 
the school the family actually states to be first on their rank-order list, because it may 
be a “strategic” choice.  
B. The best well-being that a family can expect to achieve, given constrained school 
capacities and admission rules, defined as the school performance and proximity that 
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a family can expect to achieve if it submits its best possible rank-order list – where the 
best possible rank order list takes into account admission probabilities, and the 
constraint on the number of schools that can be listed.. 
C. The utility of the lists that parents actually submit. This is the actual utility of the school 
that children were allocated to. 
Definition A picks one school from each family’s choice set based on estimated willingness to 
travel for school quality12 and yields a level of well-being 𝑊𝐴.  This is the most common way 
of thinking about the quality of choice and is the way that has most often been studied in the 
past. But it is an appropriate definition only if there are no binding capacity constraints. 
Definition B reflects what parents can expect to experience, given both the local distribution 
of schools, and the constraints in gaining admission to those school and yields a level of well-
being 𝑊𝐵  Welfare according to definition C, call this 𝑊𝐶, can be measured directly from 
observable data. It is the realised utility from the lists that parents submit resulting in the 
schools they actually attend. 
These definitions decompose the contributions of market, admission constraints, and 
behaviour in the following way:  
• The difference between 𝑊𝐴 and 𝑊𝐵 for a given family is the welfare foregone due to 
admission constraints – if all schools were undersubscribed then they would be equal. 
• The difference between 𝑊𝐵 and 𝑊𝐶  is the welfare forgone due to parents’ 
idiosyncratic preferences, which may trade-off observable amenities for amenities 
that are unobservable in the data. In addition, the difference between 𝑊𝐵 and 𝑊𝐶  will, 
subsume any mistakes due to imperfect information about performance or the 
chances of admission. 
Variation in 𝑊𝐴 across families in different localities represents the part of the variation in 
quality of choice that is attributable to the uneven geographical distribution of high-
performing schools. When policy-makers speak of ‘cold spots’ in school quality they often 
operationalise the idea in this way. However, our framework takes account of, for example,  
that there may well be a high-performing school within a reasonable travel time of the vast 
majority of children, but often those schools are over-subscribed, and therefore only a small 
minority of children may be able to access them. 
The framework also allows us to evaluate how much of the variation, across the 12 different 
demographic groups, that achieve a place at a high-performing sch is due to individual 
decision-making: either parents not valuing performance (as measured) or not being aware 
of measures of performance, or not using the admissions system in the optimal way. 
Definitions A and B do not model the admission system and capacity constraints. Definition B 
is our main contribution to this literature. 𝑊𝐵 provides a realistic measurement of variation 
in the choice sets available to families of different demographic groups, allowing for the 
possibility that two families living in the same street may have very different choice sets, due 
to having differing admission priorities at local schools.  
 
12 The discrete choice model is estimated separately for each of the 12 demographic groups defined by cross-
classifications of ethnicity, pupil premium and KS2 attainment. We predict choices using type-specific estimates 
of willingness to travel. 
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Given an admission system, comprising an school choice mechanism including details such as 
the maximum number of preferences that parents can state, a set of school capacities, and 
each school’s admission priority rules, a parent maximises the expected quality of the 
allocation13 by submitting a preference list that optimally trades off the quality of listed 
schools against the probability of admission to each of those schools. This would require 
comparing the expected utility of submitting each preference list; for an average-sized school 
market this would be a daunting task for a parent. A parent living in London, with a maximum 
of six preferences to list, and having 15 nearby schools to choose from, would have to 
consider approximately 3.6 million different ways of filling in the preference list14.  
 
13 We do not assume here that parents are maximising expected utility (the standard definition of a rational 
decision-maker in economics and decision theory) or that maximising the expected quality, measured by one 
observable quantity, is equivalent to maximising expected utility, or that parents’ subjective probabilities of 
admission coincide with our estimates. Instead, we use the maximisation of a single measure of quality as a 
benchmark against which to assess the variation in choice sets, and parents’ responses to this variation. 
14 The number of ways of choosing six ordered items from 15 is 15!/(15-6)! = 3.6m . This assumes that full lists 
are always better than partial ones. If the parent also has to consider partial lists, the number is even greater. 
Fortunately,  Chade and Smith (2006) show that the decision-maker can select an optimal lottery sequentially 
by adding, at each stage, the school that provides the largest marginal improvement in expected utility. We use 
this marginal improvement algorithm to calculate 𝑊𝐵  for each child. 
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5. Parents’ preferences and “strategic” choice behaviour 
5.1   Descriptive evidence on choice behaviour 
Figure 4 shows that demographic groups differ systematically in their use of the preference 
lists provided by local authorities. Minority ethnic families use a considerably larger number 
of preference choices, on average, averaged across all England (left) and for just London 
(right). For each ethnicity, the parents of children scoring in the top tercile at KS2 use more 
choices than those with scoring lower children. For each ethnicity type and for each tercile 
(i.e third) of the KS2 distribution parents of children eligible for Pupil Premium use fewer 
choices on average, although this variation is smaller than the variation by ethnicity and KS2.  
Figure 4:  Mean list length used by groups, classified by binary ethnicity, Pupil-Premium 
status, and KS2 attainment terciles  
 
Figure 5:  Mean quality (5+ A*-C) of listed schools by ethnicity, Pupil-Premium status, 
and KS2 tercile. 
 
According to Figure 5, the average quality of listed schools reflects the same pattern. If 
minority ethnic parents are ranking higher-quality, presumably more popular, schools, this is 
part of the explanation of the difference in proportions achieving their first-choice school.  
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5.2   Discrete choice evidence 
The aim of discrete choice analysis is to model parental decision-making, between mutually 
exclusive alternative schools, when faced with a trade-off between proximity (for example, 
avoiding large home-school commutes) and school performance. 
Tabulating the proportions of parents who choose different schools does not account for the 
uneven spatial distribution of pupils and schools. But, by using a statistical model, we can 
account for these spatial irregularities and uncover patterns in the choices that parents make, 
given the options that they face. 
The main focus of the current analysis is to produce estimates of parents’ Willingness to 
Travel (WTT) for improvements in academic performance, and compare these estimates 
across demographic groups and across locations. Thus, this way we can directly quantify any 
geographic or demographic variation in parental engagement with school choice.  
The estimated willingnesses to travel will be used in the evaluations of choice sets to predict 
the ‘best’ school in each family’s choice set given its estimated preferences, and the ‘best’ 
school they can expect to achieve after taking into account the chances of admission. 
Previous work to model parental school preferences is limited, because of the lack of 
availability of choice data. In the UK, Burgess et al. (2015) used the Millenium Cohort Study 
to conduct a discrete choice analysis of primary school choices. In the US, Hastings et al. 
(2005), and Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2015) have also used choice data to study the determinants 
of preferences. The present study uses a similar methodology to these previous studies. 
However, the data at our disposal is of a scale and quality that has not been used before in 
the UK or the US, and consequently much richer models may be estimated. 
5.2.1 The model 
A discrete choice model shares the same basic structure as a regression model. There is a 
dependent variable, in this case a binary variable indicating whether a pupil chose a particular 
school, and a set of independent (predictor) variables whose influence upon the dependent 
variable is being modelled15.  The convention in discrete choice modelling is to conceptualise 
the regression model as predicting a latent (unobserved) variable - called utility. Each family 
is assumed to have a separate utility value for each school, which is known to the family but 
unobserved by the researcher. The family simply chooses the school which gives it the 
greatest amount of utility. A family’s utility for a school is a function of the explanatory 
variables – observed variables relating to the school’s characteristics, the family’s/child’s 
characteristics, and interactions of the two – plus a random idiosyncratic element that 
captures the effect of unobserved heterogeneity between parents (akin to the error term in 
a regression). Such models are therefore sometimes known as random utility models in the 
literature.  
 
15 Since the dependent variable is a binary variable, and not a continuous variable, an extra stage in the modelling 
is needed - to transform the continuous linear predictions of the regression model into statements about the 
probability of the dependent variable taking a value of one, which corresponds to the family choosing the school, 
and zero otherwise. A purely linear model would not be constrained to predict the probability of choosing a 
school to be between 0 and 1. However a model that specifies the log of the odds ratio as linear in the 
explanatory variables is know as a Logit model and the corresponding version of this, use here, that considers 
many possible choices is the multinomial logit model.  
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5.2.2 The Convenience vs Performance trade-off in school choice 
The estimated coefficients of a multinomial logit discrete choice model can be interpreted as 
log odds ratios, relating the odds of a pupil choosing a given school when a particular variable 
in the model is at a particular value, to the odds of choosing a school after a unit change in 
that variable. However, this interpretation is not intuitively easy to use. Additionally, as the 
number of demographic groups for whom the coefficients are separately estimated increases, 
the interpretation of interactions between variables and pupil group identifiers becomes 
increasingly complicated.  
We require a straightforward representation that relates the estimated choice model to 
parental decision-making, so that the relative strength of demand for academic performance 
is revealed. Typically, in discrete choice contexts where money is involved, coefficients can 
be converted into monetary values, known as “willingness to pay”. In the context of school 
choice no money changes hands, so we use distance, rather than money, as a yardstick against 
which to measure intensity of preference for test scores. The idea is that parents may face a 
trade-off between seeking a school with high academic performance, and the convenience of 
settling for a closer school. Note that, for any given family, no trade-off between distance and 
performance may be necessary – the best school may also be the closest – but the model 
allows the estimation of trade-offs that parents would make, if they had to. A parent’s 
Willingness to Travel (WTT) can be interpreted as an approximation to the additional distance 
that a parent would be “willing” (willingness here meant in an economic sense as 
encompassing both willingness and ability) to travel for a 10 point improvement in test scores 
(say, from 70% achieving 5+ A*-C at GCSE to 80%).  
5.2.3 Non-randomness of home location 
In interpreting the results of the choice model, and especially in interpreting estimated 
willingness to travel, the non-random assignment of pupils to home locations, arising from 
their choice of home location being motivated, in part, by the proximity to good schools, must 
be considered. The locations of family homes are not completely independent of the quality 
of the local school market, since families choose where to live partly on the basis of the quality 
of the local school market. We do not model this location choice process. It is possible that 
part of a family’s overall Willingness to Travel for academic quality has been subsumed within 
previous residential moves, for example by compromising between the child school commute 
and parental work commutes in choosing where to live. This is, of course, mediated by house 
prices, which is likely to depend, in part, on demand for nearby schools. 
If there are systematic variations in the ways that different demographic groups choose 
where to live, whether because of differences in ability to pay or for any other reason, the 
estimated Willingness to Travel may reflect these differences, rather than underlying 
attitudes to schooling. For example, a demographic group may appear to be less willing to 
travel whereas, in fact, they are more likely to choose to live in an area that is already near to 
preferred schools. What this means is that we can only interpret Willingness to Travel relative 
to the residential distribution of demographic groups. This is a limitation of all existing 
discrete choice estimation of parents’ preferences for schools (see, for example Hastings, 
Kane, and Staiger 2005; Deming et al. 2014; Burgess et al. 2015). By ignoring the potential 
endogeneity of location we rely on an assumption of “selection-on-observables”, whereby 
parents choose where to live based on observable amenities whose effects we can allow for 
by including them in the explanatory variables in our discrete choice model.  
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This is a limitation of all existing discrete choice estimation of parents’ preferences for schools 
(see, for example Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2005; Deming et al. 2014; Burgess et al. 2015). 
We impose an assumption of selection-on-observables, whereby parents choose where to 
live based on observable amenities which we can adjust for by including them in the discrete 
choice model. Thus, our estimates should be interpreted as the determinants of school choice 
conditional on location. 
Unlike previous work, our estimation method yields not just willingness to “pay” for quality – 
the trade-off that parents appear willing to make in order to access better quality schooling. 
But it also provides estimates of the probability that a parent will “strategise” – ie make 
choices based on the expected utility of the listed choices, rather than selecting purely on the 
basis of the most attractive L schools, where L is the number of choices that parents are 
allowed to list. This estimated probability of being an expected-utility maximiser rather than 
a simple utility maximiser allows us to compute the welfare implications of the distribution of 
school quality.  
5.3   Discrete choice results 
In order to estimate ρ we need data on the distances to all schools, the qualities of schools, 
their Z’s, each parent’s ranking of schools, and the probability that i will get admitted to s 
based on the admission criteria (distance, and whether i has an older sibling in s) and on Pis.  
The estimation method involves choosing a value for ρ (and one for β and for γ) computing 
the rankings of schools predicted by that value for each and every parent, and then compare 
the resulting rankings with the actual rankings of parents. Then, by varying the “guess” for ρ, 
we can find the best “fitting” value of ρ (and, similarly, for β and γ), which is those that best 
explain the observed rankings across parents. Of course, no value of ρ (together with 
corresponding β and γ) will completely match every parents’ ranking because there is 
unobservable variation across i due to the distribution of ξi - which represents the 
idiosyncratic elements of preferences that we cannot measure. This estimation process might 
sound laborious but it is not computationally very intensive even for such a huge dataset in 
the case of the multinomial logit model. 
We estimate the parameters separately for each group, where the groups are divided 
according to FSM=0 or not, ethnicity being white British or not, and KS2 being in the top, 
middle, or bottom third of the national distribution of KS2. That is, the data is divided into 12 
cells according to these characteristics. Each cell is sufficiently large that we can obtain really 
quite statistically precise estimates of the parameters.  In Figure 6 we present the estimates 
of ρ, for each cell, together with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals that describe 
how precise each estimate is. Since the dataset is very large, these confidence intervals are 
quite narrow so that even small differences tend to be statistically significant.  
The estimates of  ρ shown in Figure 6 suggest that, for given Q, No-FSM, non-white, high KS2 
children are prepared to travel much further (almost 1.4km each way), compared to white 
British, low KS2, FSM children (who are only prepared to travel an addition 0.4km for the 
same increase in Q). The estimates are surprisingly consistent across groups: for each of the 
four combinations of ethnicity and FSM, the higher is the KS2 of  the child the further he is 
willing to travel to get an extra unit of Q; and for each KS2 cell non--FSM children are willing 
to travel further than the FSM, and the minority children are willing to travel further than the 
white British. The differences in the estimates of ρ shown in Figure 6 are sufficiently precisely  
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Figure 6 Estimated ρ (willingness to travel for greater quality) parameters for each 
group 
 
Notes: The 12 demographic groups are cross-classified by ethnicity (white British, Minority); Pupil Premium 
eligibility; and terciles of KS2 (end of primary school test) attainment (high, medium, low). Willingness to Travel 
is evaluated at 2.5 km. For each estimate, the vertical line is the point estimate, while the thick bars show the 
interquartile range, and the thin bars show the 95% confidence intervals of the estimate. 
Figure 7 Estimated β (risk aversion) parameter for each group 
 
Notes: The 12 demographic groups are cross-classified by ethnicity (white British, Minority); Pupil Premium 
eligibility; and terciles of KS2 (end of primary school test) attainment (high, medium, low). Willingness to Travel 
is evaluated at 2.5 km. For each estimate, the vertical line is the point estimate, while the thick bars show the 





estimated that they are statistically significantly different from each other. For example, the 
differences across KS2 groups for each if the 4 cells of FSM/white are significantly different. 
And, for given KS2 group, the differences between each of the four FSM/white cells are 
significantly different from each other, at the 95% level of confidence, except for the top KS3 
comparisons between No-FSM and FSM non-white groups.  
Dividing the data in this way into 12 cells seems to be a useful way of capturing the differences 
in preferences according to some of the principal observable variables in the data. 
We also visualise, in Figure 7, the estimates of the strategizing parameter, β, that captures 
the risk aversion of the 12 different types of parents. These β estimates are slightly less 
precise than our ρ estimates in Figure 3, but similar patterns emerge. Risk aversion is 
measured along the horizontal axis in this case. Thus, Non-FSM / High-KS2 / white British 
parents are more cautious then otherwise similar non-white parents. 
In interpreting the results of the choice model, and especially in interpreting the estimated 
“willingnesses to travel”, we take no view of the source of the variation in preferences. There 
are a variety of reasons why these may vary across individual families within groups and 
across groups. A number of factors come to mind. The return on investment in education 
through school quality might be higher for minority children – foresighted parents may wish 
to compensate for the disadvantage that they feel that their children might experience in the 
labour market and respond to this by placing a greater weight on school quality in their 
preferences. Even if they do not, minority parents might face tighter credit market constraints 
than other parents because of their lower average wealth – this makes it more difficult, at 
any given income, to raise a mortgage large enough to finance a location more favourable to 
school quality. In response they locate further away and encourage their children to travel 
further.  The locations of family homes are not completely independent of the quality of the 
local school market, since families choose where to live partly on the basis of the quality of 
the local school market. We do not model this location choice process. It is possible that part 
of a family’s overall willingness to travel for academic quality has been subsumed within 
previous residential moves, for example by compromising between the school commute and 
work commutes in choosing where to live. This is, of course, mediated by house prices, which 
may differ according to demand for, and supply of capacity in, nearby schools. 
If there are systematic variations in the ways that different demographic groups choose 
where to live, whether because of differences in ability to pay or for any other reason, the 
estimated Willingness to Travel may reflect these differences, rather than underlying 
attitudes to schooling or to the well-being of children. For example, a demographic group may 
appear to be less willing to travel, whereas in fact they are more likely to choose to live in an 
area that is already near to preferred schools. What this means is that we can only interpret 
willingness to travel relative to the residential distribution of demographic groups. With a 
richer dataset one might be able to capture more of the heterogeneity in preferences by 
dividing the data into more finely differentiated cells. For the moment we think of our 
estimates as relevant to the parents in our data and those might vary by age and/or by cohort 





6 School admissions and equity of access 
In this section we explore the relationships between geography, demographics, and access to 
high-performing schools. Subsection 6.1 begins by reviewing evidence from the raw 
administrative records, and reveals striking variation in the probability of accessing the first-
choice school by ethnic group. We then present results in subsection 6.2  from the choice-set 
decomposition, showing that much of this apparent inequality of access is explained by 
different demographic groups making more ambitious first choices, although some inequality 
of access remains. 
6.1   Descriptive evidence on admissions 
Using the newly available national preferences data, Weldon (2018) documented that 
minority ethnic families are much less likely to be admitted to their first-choice school than 
white British families. This pattern does not disappear when socio-economic status 
(measured by Free-school-meals eligibility) and prior attainment are accounted for, and does 
not appear to be an artefact of the geographical distributions of each group. 
Figure 8 shows that within each ethnic group, Londoners (red) are much less likely to be 
admitted to their first-choice school than England as a whole (grey) .  Minority ethnic families 
are, on average, 17% less likely to achieve their first-choice school than white British, and the 
gap is larger for black than Asian or Other, and this pattern persists when looking only at 
London.  Figure 9 shows the breakdown of this  
Figure 9 shows how the first-choice admission proportion varies across groups - outside 
London, and within London. The proportion, for all groups, is only slightly lower in London 
than in the rest of the UK. However, across the country, the proportion is lower for minorities 
than whites. And there is a consistent gradient with respect to the KS2 terciles (labelled low, 
medium, high) – the most able have a lower proportion, and the least able a higher 
proportion, than the middle group, irrespective of ethnic group and Pupil Premium group. 
The pupil premium effect itself is very small. Our overall impression from Figure 9 is that there 
is little, if any, evidence of cherry-picking by schools.  
To explore ethnicity differences in more depth, Figure 10 shows the proportion admitted to 
their first-choice school broken down by school category, ethnicity and distance quintile. The 
gap between ethnic minority groups and the white British majority in the chances of 
admission widens with distance from the school, as one would expect. The extent to which 
this happens is likely to be lower for richer families who are better able to locate near their 
first-choice school. Of particular interest is the slope for community schools, as we know that 
these schools have no scope for admissions rules that might disadvantage minority ethnic 
families conditional on distance. That the pattern in this type of school is shared with 
Academies suggests that the differences are largely caused by different choice preferences 












Figure 9:  Proportion admitted to first-choice school by binary ethnicity, Pupil-Premium 






Figure 10:  Proportion admitted to first-choice school by school type, ethnicity, and distance(quintiles) 
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6.2     Results of the welfare analysis 
In this section we present results from applying the three definitions of choice set quality to 
the Autumn 2014 cohort of secondary school entrants. The aim of this analysis is to evaluate 
whether variation in choice behaviour and chances of admission for different demographic 
groups results in systematic differences in the quality of outcomes from the admission 
process.  
We compute utility under our three definitions: definition A is the best school that could be 
achieved given the list that the family submits; B is what is achievable given the list submitted 
which takes account of the constraints associated with the limited list length ; and C is what 
is actually achieved.  
Welfare according to definition C, call this 𝑊𝐶, can be measured directly from observable data 
– we simply need to know Q and log D for that school and we can compute utility accordingly. 
Definition 𝑊𝐴 is model-based, it picks one school from each family’s choice set based on 
estimated willingness to travel for school quality16.  This is the way in which the quality of 
choice has been measured in the past. Definition 𝑊𝐵 reflects what parents can expect to 
experience, given both the local distribution of schools, and the constraints in gaining 
admission to those schools. Our aim is to decompose the difference in welfare between A and 
C into the difference that is due to constraints, ie A-B and the difference that is due to 
preferences, B-C.  The definitions of A, B and C allow us to decompose the contributions of 
admission constraints, and preferences in the following way:  
• The difference between 𝑊𝐴 and 𝑊𝐵 for a given family is the welfare foregone due to 
admission constraints – if all schools were undersubscribed then these would be equal 
and there would be no difference. We think of this as the loss in welfare associated 
with insufficient capacity.  
• The difference between 𝑊𝐵 and 𝑊𝐶  is the welfare forgone due to parents’ 
idiosyncratic preferences, which may trade-off observable for unobservable amenities 
and will, in addition, include any sub-optimal choices due to imperfect information 
about performance admission chances. We think of this as the role of preferences. 
Figure 11 shows how the welfare difference between the ideal school and the actual school 
attended decomposes for groups defined by ethnicity. The gap is largest for black families at 
a 1.7 (equivalent to having to travel almost an additional 6-fold difference in distance – close 
to 15 kms more)! This is followed by other ethnicities, then by south-asian. Finally, the gap 
for white families is much smaller at 0.7 (equivalent to a 2-fold increase in distance – or 5km).  
The breakdown of these large welfare losses, based our estimates, is that for the minority 
ethnic group the loss due to constraints is approximately ½ which is equivalent to a 50% rise 
in distance – or 1.3km. The rest of the loss is due to preferences. In the case of white families 
only about 1/3rd of the overall welfare loss is due to constraints – equivalent to about 0.4km. 
It is clear that the school choice system that is necessitated by the scarcity of capacity in good 
schools, imposes a much larger adverse impact on non-white groups compared to white 
groups.  
 
16 The discrete choice model is estimated separately for each of the 12 demographic groups defined by cross-
classifications of ethnicity, pupil premium and KS2 attainment. We predict choices using the estimates of 
willingness to travel specific to each type. 
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Figure 11:  Welfare gaps between 'Best' and 'Achievable' (A - B) and between 'Achievable'  
and 'Achieved' (B - C) by ethnic group. 
 
Notes: Utilities are scaled such that log utility differences correspond to log ratios of distance equivalents. For example, a log 
utility difference of 0.69 is equivalent to the utility loss from travelling twice as far. The difference (B – C) incorporates utility 
loss due to sub-optimal choice, but also incorporates preferences for unobservable amenities. The difference (A – B) 
incorporates the potential gains from redistributing existing capacity to eliminate capacity constraints. 
Figure 12 slices the results by area type. Families living in major urban areas are much worse 
off, than those in non-major urban areas, who in turn experience slightly bigger loses than 
rural area families. Figure 13 slice the results by family income by comparing those who are 
Pupil Premium eligible and those who are not. On average the loss is close to a unit change in 
welfare (equivalent to almost a 3-fold rise in travel) – somewhat larger for the PP families 
compared to non-PP. In both cases the loss due to constraints is approximately 0.3 – 
equivalent to around a 50% rise in travel distance. 
Finally, the heat map in Figure 14 contrasts the distributions of expected school quality across 
LA’s under our three alternative definitions. Bluer indicates higher proportions achieving 5+ 
GCSEs, redder means lower proportions – than the average (of 63%).  Definition C is based on 
the observed schools and is the one that is typically used to think about the geographical 
differences in education quality. East Anglia, the SW, parts of the East Midlands and Cumbria 
are the cold spots, and hotspots are largely limited to the Home Counties. Definition B is what 
could be achieved, given the capacity constraints. Many overall improvements are possible 
by allocating children to schools using our estimated preferences for them. Shropshire, 
Lancashire, and Kent become hotter. Definition A shows what might be achieved if only 
capacity constraints were relaxed. We see dark blue emerging for much more of the SE 
including Kent, Lincolnshire and improvements across Cheshire, Lancashire and Yorkshire. 
Our estimates suggest that constraints matter a lot, but differentially across areas. 
The school choice system is necessitated by the scarcity of capacity in good schools. The 
constraints on capacity impose a much larger adverse impact on ethnic minority groups, those 
living in major urban areas, and families in receipt of pupil premium. These constraints matter 
a lot, but the effect is felt differentially across different areas of the country. Moving from C 
to B in Figure 10 suggests that preferences matter, the move from B to A shows that capacity 
matters too. 
BLACK OTHER SOUTHASIAN WHITE























Figure 12:  Welfare gaps between 'Best' and 'Achievable' (A - B) and between  
'Achievable' and 'Achieved' (B - C) by major-urban/urban/rural types 
 
Notes: Utilities are scaled such that log utility differences correspond to log ratios of distance equivalents. For example, a log 
utility difference of 0.69 is equivalent to the utility loss from travelling twice as far. The difference (B – C) incorporates utility 
loss due to sub-optimal choice, but also incorporates preferences for unobservable amenities. The difference (A – B) 
incorporates the potential gains from redistributing existing capacity to eliminate capacity constraints. 
 
Figure 13:  Welfare gaps between 'Best' and 'Achievable' (A - B) and between Achievable' 
and 'Achieved' (B - C) by Pupil Premium 
 
Notes: Utilities are scaled such that log utility differences correspond to log ratios of distance equivalents. For example, a log 
utility difference of 0.69 is equivalent to the utility loss from travelling twice as far. The difference (B – C) incorporates utility 
loss due to sub-optimal choice, but also incorporates preferences for unobservable amenities. The difference (A – B) 
incorporates the potential gains from redistributing existing capacity to eliminate capacity constraints.  
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6.3    Policy application: could increasing list lengths improve welfare? 
The choice set quality measures derived here can be used to evaluate the effects of 
hypothetical reforms to school choice. The advantage of our ‘Definition B’ measure over other 
measures is that it is sensitive to factors affecting the probability of admission to a school, 
such as the school’s capacity, admission oversubscription rules and the design of the 
admission market. To give an example of the application of this measure, we evaluate a 
hypothetical reform, of increasing the maximum allowed length of rank-order lists that 
parents can choose. 
The purpose of this hypothetical exercise is to demonstrate that our estimates could be used 
to simulate the effects of reforms – in principal any reforms that work through the admission 
mechanism. We can simulate the effects of reforms on how children get segregated across 
schools, and hence the mix of children within schools. Here, however, we focus only on the 
welfare implications associated with the specific reform that increases list lengths. This 
particular example is interesting in that it has an effectively zero cost of implementation. 
However, we expect this reform to show only modest effects on average for two important 
reasons.  
Firstly, recall that Figure 2 showed that there are a  significant minority r of LA’s (outside of 
London) where the number of parents who are using ALL of their available choices– we think 
of this as showing that there is an appetite for greater choice, especially  in those areas. That 
is, we would not expect much welfare improvement in increasing choice in LAs where there 
is no appetite for it. Secondly, the analytical data were collected at a time (2013, 2014) when 
the size of the age 11 cohort was at a historically low point. That is, there was more choice 
available at that time than has been the case for quite a while. If we were able to implement 
this exercise for the latest cohort then we might expect to find large overall effects since 
school capacity constraints are now more important and there are now more schools that are 
oversubscribed. 
As discussed in Section 2, LA’s vary in the number of schools they permit families to rank. In 
London, for example, all boroughs allow parents to rank up to six schools on the application 
form. Many other LA’s allow parents to rank a maximum of only three schools. We imagine 
that these constraints affect the efficiency of choices in two ways. First, if parents were to 
continue to rank schools according to their true preferences, the constrained list would 
reduce the probability of children being allocated to one of their parents’ top preferences. 
This is because if the child is not allocated to any school on the list, the child will be allocated 
to a nearby school with spare capacity. This may, therefore, increase the probability of the 
child being allocated to a school much further down the parents’ true list of preferences. 
Secondly, parents may compensate for the constrained list by adjusting their stated 
preferences, to make them less ambitious. This would compensate for some of the loss of 
efficiency caused by the list length constraint, but would compromise the mechanism’s 
strategy-proofness property. 
Table 1 shows the results of a counterfactual exercise, calculating the expected quality 
(definition B) for children, based on the actual list size, and then based on scenarios where 
the list size is increased to ten17.  Increasing the list length to ten schools improves expected 
quality (using the expected value of the 5 GCSE A*-C measure), but only by 0.15 percentage 
 
17 We also increased the list size to twenty, but additional welfare gains were negligible. 
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points. However, for minority ethnicities the measure increases by 0.2 percentage points or 
more. This difference is likely due to the fact that minority ethnic families tend to have lower 
average probabilities of admission into their first-choice schools. This, in turn, may be partly 
due to being more likely to live in urban areas that are near to over-capacity schools, but not 
near enough to be admitted, and partly due to them being less likely to have priority at faith 
schools.  
Table 2 shows the same analysis broken down by terciles of prior attainment at primary 
school. The gains in test scores of the allocated school are disproportionately made by those 
in the top tercile of the KS2 distribution. It seems that the highest ability children are those 
whose potential is most constrained by the limited list lengths. 
In summary, the list length reform had variable effects, but in almost all cases it either left 
the expected allocation unchanged or increased the expected test scores and distance. In 
most LA’s the average increase was less than 0.2 percentage points for test scores (Q), and by 
a tint proportional difference in D (less than 20 metres). 
Table 1:  Expected % with 5+ GCSEss of allocations (definition B) with different 
counterfactual maximum list sizes, by ethnic group 
 
WHITE BLACK OTHER 
SOUTH 
ASIAN All 
Status quo 61.76 65.03 66.25 64.64 62.75 
List 10 schools 61.92 65.22 66.46 64.85 62.87 
% Change in WB 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.12 
Notes: Definition B denotes the expected quality (in % achieving 5+ A*-C) that can be achieved with a given list length and a 
given set of preferences. The bottom row shows the % differences between row 2 and row 1. All units are percentage points 
Table 2:  Expected % with %+ GCSEs of allocations (definition B) with different 
counterfactual maximum list sizes, by KS2 attainment tercile 
 
Bottom 3rd Middle 3rd Top 3rd All 
Status quo 58.50 63.34 70.37 62.75 
List 10 schools 58.58 63.51 70.59 62.87 
% Change in WB 0.08 0.17 0.22 0.12 
Notes: Definition B denotes the expected quality (in % achieving 5+ A*-C) that can be achieved with a given list length and a 




7 Policy implications 
In this section, we discuss four policy themes suggested by the analysis: list length;  admission 
mechanisms; choice architectures; and using the analysis here as a step towards 
incorporating school choice into wider education policy issues – starting with the relationship 
with social mobility. 
7.1    List length 
A discussion of policy recommendations from our research must begin with what we consider 
to be the easiest reform to implement: increasing the allowed number of preference slots for 
each parent. Currently, around half of LA’s allow parents to rank no more than three schools. 
Although in some authorities this appears to be sufficient for the majority of parents, in other 
local authorities it is likely to not be enough – and this forces parents to make difficult 
strategic decisions about which schools to include in their three choices. 
In London, on the other hand, all families are allowed to rank up to six schools, but it is not 
clear whether even this number is sufficient, and our analysis suggests that some groups of 
parents would have a greater chance of achieving a good allocation for their children if they 
were allowed to rank more schools. An increase in the maximum size of lists to, say, ten 
schools, would only affect those parents for whom the existing limit is binding; and for parents 
who currently do not fill their lists the additional slots would make no difference. 
It may be argued that increasing list lengths would have unintended psychological 
consequences: for example, perhaps parents would feel compelled to ‘fill the space’ and 
therefore rank schools about which they have only second-hand or vague information (say, 
because they have not been able to visit schools 5-10 on their list). However, this must be 
evaluated against the status quo, where families, if they are not admitted to their first, 
second, or third preferences, have no say at all in where their children will eventually be 
assigned. Arguably, parents should be trusted to invest ‘enough’ time in obtaining 
information for decision-making, where ‘enough’ should be defined broadly. Parents ranking 
schools about which they have only second-hand or vague information can be rational if the 
probability of assignment to a low-ranked school is not high enough to justify the additional 
effort to acquire information. 
It is likely that, with more choices, parents’ first choices become more ambitious, so headline 
statistics on the number allocated to their first preference would probably decrease, whereas 
the number allocated to any of their choices would increase. Preferences would more 
straightforwardly signal demand for schools, and would therefore be more useful in planning 
and forecasting. Additionally, to the extent that school choice creates incentives for schools 
to improve to attract pupils, the reform would make market demand signals more 
trustworthy, and possibly improve the effectiveness of the market as a mechanism for 
improvement. 
For parents, therefore, this would be an innocuous reform. For schools, however, the 
additional applications might present an additional administrative burden. However, this 
would only affect own-admissions schools, which rank their own applications according to 
their own criteria. For these schools, the additional administrative burden would be 
proportional to the complexity and level of subjective judgement required in ranking 
applications. A reform might, therefore, have the beneficial side-effect of incentivising 
schools to make their admission rules more transparent and less subjective. 
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A reform to increase the length of preference lists would affect those families who currently 
complete their preference lists (and presumably would be able to make good use of additional 
choices). Since parents of minority ethnicities are more likely to rank additional schools, they 
are more likely to benefit from the reform. The results of our analysis bear this out: the 
improvement in expected quality for minority ethnic groups, from moving to ten slots, is 
larger than it is for white families. 
7.2   Admission mechanisms 
In 2007, the Admissions Code outlawed a previously popular school allocation mechanism, 
and forced many LAs to adopt new allocation mechanisms. According to Pathak and Sonmez, 
(2013) and Coldron (2007) the vast majority of local authorities adopted variants of the 
Deferred Acceptance algorithm. However, there does not appear to be any central oversight 
of the details, implementation, or effects of allocation mechanisms used by authorities. 
This may be a problem, since it is unlikely that local authorities themselves possess the 
technical expertise to evaluate their own admission algorithms. LAs usually outsource this 
function, and it appears that many use admission algorithms provided as part of software 
packages by database vendors, such as Capita, SAP etc. While there is no reason to believe 
that algorithms provided by these vendors are not fit for purpose, it does raise the question 
of who provides oversight of these very technical mechanisms. Who validates, for example, 
that allocation mechanisms intended to guarantee some property such as stability or 
optimality, actually fulfil this criterion? 
The problem here is that, as the law does not stipulate that an admission mechanism should 
satisfy any particular property, there is no commonly-agreed set of standards upon which 
central or local governments can base an evaluation of allocation mechanisms and their 
implementation in software.  
Indeed, although strategy-proofness and stability are two properties that are often invoked 
in the theoretical literature on matching, there is by no means an academic consensus that 
school choice mechanisms should always satisfy either or both of these properties, and there 
are several examples of real-world allocation mechanisms that, by design, do not meet either 
or both of these criteria. 
A promising approach to raising the profile of mechanism design in local authorities, that has 
been popular in the US, would be for local authorities to provide researchers with the 
necessary data18 to simulate the effects of different matching mechanisms, that would 
facilitate deliberation within local authorities about the relative merits of different 
mechanisms, and the trade-offs between the properties of these mechanisms. 
7.3   Choice architectures: information and nudge 
Inspection of the existing choice architectures suggest that the advice provided to applicants 
is very limited. Many seem to encourage conservatism in applicants - to strategize by making 
sure that they list schools that they are likely to be admitted to. None seem to provide simple 
diagrammatic visualisations of the possible choices and their respective qualities and 
 
18 Parents’ ranked preferences data is now available nationally, but schools’ ranked priority data and capacities 
are still not routinely made available to researchers. Given that ranked preferences, linked to National Pupil 
Database, are arguably much more sensitive and personal than schools’ oversubscription criteria, the case for 
sharing this data seems strong. 
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proximities – the simple things that we have come to expect from hotel listing websites that 
provide far less crucial services to the population.  
Indeed, very few even seem to offer crow-fly distances – something that is not readily 
available online to parents that could at least approximate the tie-breaker calculations that 
LAs do. Providing such information could make a large difference – it could ensure that 
parents were well informed about the good schools where they are likely to gain admission.    
Our own research could provide the basis of a recommender algorithm – indeed if the 
websites were linked to NPD it maybe be possible to provide customised advice, of the kind 
that users will be familiar with from choosing within streamed TV services, that might produce 
better matches at the individual level. Even in the absence of a link to NPD it would be 
possible, with a supplied postcode, to provide less specific advice on choices that might 
appear to be driven by idiosyncratic decisions – for example, an algorithm could be designed 
to point out that a better AND closer school was available. Or it could easily advise that, in 
previous years, your child would have sufficient priority to be admitted to a set of particular 
schools. Indeed, if NPD were used to identify older sibling, school, and postcode, it would be 
possible to say which school(s) one could be (almost) guaranteed a place at. This would have 
the effect of lessening the impact of limited list lengths on the incentive to strategize.  
7.4    Towards wider educational policy: school choice and social mobility 
Changing admission criteria will change who gets into which school – and hence changes each 
school’s social mix, or “balance”. One suggestion is to include a priority for disadvantaged 
families whereby a number of places are reserved for applicants from less well-off 
backgrounds, for example based on eligibility for the Pupil Premium. But many other ideas 
are possible. There are two channels by which admission criteria can change outcomes. First, 
it can change the “matches” between schools and children.  For example, after some reform, 
a given child might get matched to a different school. This affects equality of opportunities 
(to attend a good school) that, in turn, affects social mobility (SM). To the extent that a reform 
results in lower achieving children getting matched to “better” schools we might expect it to 
improve SM. Secondly, even if a particular child is post-reform matched to the same school 
as would occur under the  status-quo admission criteria there may still be an effect on 
outcomes. This could arise if the mix of peers at that school (its “balance”) changed and there 
were peer effects on outcomes. 
 “Balance” depends on how children get distributed across schools which determines who 
goes to school with who – and, hence, the within school mix of peers. Balance can be defined 
with reference to observable characteristics such as parental background, child ability, 
ethnicity, parental background, gender, etc. The within school mix may affect outcomes for 
each child through peer effects - outcomes such as the child’s educational attainment and, 
ultimately, her income. Therefore, the mix of children within a school contributes to the 
outcomes of all children within the school via peer effects. Thus, it seems natural to merge 
the analysis here with a model of peer effects so we can model the effect of admission criteria 
on the outcomes for the children via peer effects.  Of course, other factors will matter for 
child outcomes. A model of peer effects could capture these additional considerations via 
school “fixed effects” (FE)– an estimated parameter for each school that reflects the school’s 
“value added” abstracting from the effects of the composition of pupils, where each FE 
measures the effectiveness of a school in teaching those children admitted. Longitudinal 




This report summarises our research on school choice based on using the newly available 
secondary school choice data. This provides the raw data on the rank-order lists constructed 
by parents of 10 year olds destined for secondary schools. We are able to link the data to NPD 
information on prior ability, and subsequent secondary school attended. We use the data to 
model how parents, as revealed by the preferences they submit to admission authorities, 
trade-off school proximity against school quality and the probability of admission. The latter 
is an important element of our story – something that is missing from previous research. 
Previous research has relied heavily on the theoretical presumption that the Deferred 
Acceptance algorithm is strategy-proof – that is, it frees parents from having to engage in 
strategizing behaviour. However, the proof depends on being ale to list all schools, without 
limit. While its not clear how long lists have to be for the theorem to hold its seems very likely 
that three will be too little. 
 
On average, we estimate that parents place a considerable weight on school performance 
(our proxy for quality). By observing their choices we suggest that parents are prepared to 
allow their child to travel an additional 0.9 km (when the mean distance is around 2.5 km) to 
achieve a 10 percentage point better quality school. This is a considerable burden that 
households seem to be willing to pay. We also find large differences around the average in 
the willingness to pay (i.e. travel for) for school performance across types of parents. For 
white British parents the willing less is around 0.8km while it is approximately 1.1km for non-
white minority parents on average – a difference is highly statistically significant. 
We also find considerable variation across parental types in the extent to which parents 
engage in making strategic choices – choices that reflect aversion to risk.  
We explore the simplest and cheapest possible intervention – extending the length of lists 
that parents are able to specify. The raw data suggests that many Local Authorities restrict 
the ability to list sufficient schools – and this is something that causes parents to be too 
conservative in their choices. While this enables LAs to say that it has a high proportion of 
children attending their first choice – if their first choice is an unduly safe one, this is a hollow 
achievement. 
There are many instances in the data that are consistent with the rational use of the school 
choice system. Further reforms could improve the choices that parents make – through better 
information provided by tools that are familiar to us as consumers of media, transport, and 
accommodation services.  
In work in progress we show that reforms to admission criteria offer the possibility of 
manipulating the allocation of children to improve the chances of disadvantaged children to 
attend more effective schools and benefit from high ability peers. Additional social mobility 
might be obtained at minimal cost. 
We view this latter activity as the likely to become the most important aspect of our research. 
It is now beginning to be possible to develop an equivalent to the IFS tax-benefit model – but 
for education policy, not tax and welfare policy. Where the levers are not tax and benefit 
parameters but the school admission criteria, school locations, school types and capacities; 
and the trade-offs are not work vs “leisure” but proximity vs quality. Linked to LEO this would 
be an important framework for planning policy – and an important way of holding 
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